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Introduction 
 
Determinants of human migration, both internationally and within the U.S., continue to 
be of significant interest to researchers and policy makers.1 The average annual migration 
rate within the US during the period 2001-2010 was 1.7% (of the population) for males 
and 1.7% for females, indicating that a large number of people migrate each year within 
the US.2  The nature of issues considered within the context of the determinants of 
internal migration is extremely diverse; indeed, it has (naturally) become increasingly 
diverse over time. An important hypothesis in this literature about migration is the 
Tiebout hypothesis, also sometimes referred to as the Tiebout-Tullock hypothesis.3   
According to Tiebout (1956, p. 418), “…the consumer-voter may be viewed as picking 
that community which best satisfies his preferences for public goods…the consumer-
voter moves to that community whose local government best satisfies his set of 
preferences.” As Tullock (1971, p. 917) further observes, this hypothesis can effectively 
be extended such that it holds that, ceteris paribus, the “…individual deciding where to 
live will take into account the private effects upon himself of the bundle of government 
                                                          
1 For example, Renas, 1983; Vedder, et al, 1986; Percy, Hawkins, & Maier, 1995; 
Carrington, Detragiache, and Vishwanath, 1996; Saltz, 1998; Nechyba, 2000; Conway & 
Houtenville, 2001, 2003; Rhode & Strumpf, 2003; Chi & Voss, 2005; Partridge & 
Rickman, 2006; Francis, 2007; Ashby, 2007; Landry, et al., 2007; Ashby, 2010; Molloy 
et al., 2011; Fu & Gabriel, 2012; Peters, 2012; Plantinga, et al., 2013;  
2 Molloy et al., 2011.  
3 For example, see Rhode & Strumpf, 2003; Cebula & Alexander, 2006; Banzhaf & 
Walsh, 2008 
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services and taxes…” Thus, Tullock (1971), more explicitly than Tiebout (1956), 
emphasizes that the consumer-voter evaluates both the government goods and services 
and the tax burden at the locations of choice.  
The present study empirically investigates the validity of the Tiebout hypothesis 
during the “Great Recession” (from July, 2008 through July, 2009) using data on gross 
in-migration between the US states. It attempts to shed light on whether fiscal factors 
such as outlays per pupil on public primary and secondary education, parks, property tax 
burdens, and state income tax burdens influenced consumer-voters’ mobility decisions 
over this study period. Of particular interest to us is whether factors influencing gross in-
migration were different during the “Great Recession” as compared to studies that 
covered other periods.  
Numerous previous studies have empirically addressed determinants of internal 
migration within the United States. A number of these studies emphasize the migration 
impact not only of economic factors but also non-economic, including “quality-of-life” 
factors, especially climate.4 As demonstrated in these studies, the omission of non-
economic factors, especially a climate variable, from an empirical migration analysis 
constitutes an omitted-variable problem that generally compromises the integrity of that 
analysis. As a consequence, this empirical study will include not only fiscal factors and 
economic factors but also purely non-economic (quality-of-life) factors.  
The present study differs from most previous comparable studies of gross 
migration by its focus on gross in-migration during the “Great Recession” (from July, 
2008 through July, 2009)  and by the inclusion of  a separate cost of living variable and a 
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measure of effective state income tax rates. We test the hypothesis using three different 
specifications in linear, semi-log and log-log forms. After controlling for economic 
factors and quality of life/climate variables, we find that consistent with the previous 
literature during 2008-2009 migrants (consumer-voters) appear to prefer states with lower 
effective state income tax and property tax rates.  Interestingly, in contrast, their 
evaluation of government services in determining their choice of location depends upon 
the type of government service.  While consumer-voters appear on average to prefer 
states with greater public provision of state parks,   they did not manifest a strong 
preference for states with higher per pupil outlays on primary and secondary public 
education. 
The Basic Migration Decision Framework 
The consumer-voter is treated as regarding the overall migration decision as an 
investment decision such that the decision to migrate from area i to area j requires that 
his/her expected net discounted present value of migration from area i to area j, DPVij, be 
both (a) positive and (b) the maximum net discounted present value that can be expected 
from moving from area i to any other known and plausible alternative area.  
 Following in principle the models in Tiebout, (1956), Tullock (1971), Riew 
(1973), Vedder (1976), Renas (1983), Vedder, Gallaway, Graves, & Sexton (1986), and 
Cebula & Alexander (2006), among others, DPVij consists in this study of three broad 
sets of considerations, namely: 
1. Economic conditions in those areas;  
2. Fiscal factors in those areas; and an  
                                                                                                                                                                             
4 For example, Vedder 1976; Renas, 1978; 1980; 1983; Clark & Hunter, 1992; Cebula & 
Belton, 1994; Saltz, 1998; Conway & Houtenville, 1998, 2001, 2003; Gale & Heath, 
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3. Environmental characteristic of the areas. 
According to this investment framework, it follows that migration will flow from area i to 
area j only if: 
DPVij > 0; DPVij = MAX for j, where j = 1,2,…,z       (1) 
where z represents all of the plausible known alternative locations to area i. Given the 
focus in this study on state migration, area j is actually state j. Clearly, the explanatory 
variables in this model could have been introduced using an alternative framework, e.g., a 
cost-benefit framework, such as that adopted by Cebula (1997).  
To measure the migration rate, MIGj, the gross number of domestic in-migrants to 
state j over the period July, 2008-July, 2009, expressed as a percent of the year 2008 
population in state j, is adopted. This specification allows comparisons of any state’s 
migration rate with those of the other states.  
To measure the economic conditions in state j, three factors are adopted, one of 
which actually encompasses two economic dimensions. In particular, the first of the 
purely economic variables is a measure of expected per capita personal income in state j, 
EXPINCj. This variable is the product of two economic variables, namely, unity minus 
the unemployment rate in state j, where the latter is expressed in decimal form, and the 
year 2008 per capita personal income in state j: 
EXPINCj = [(1-URj) x PCPERSINCj ] + [(URj) x 0]     (2) 
where: URj is the 2008 average unemployment rate of the civilian labor force in state j, 
expressed as a decimal; and PCPERSINCj is the observed 2008 average personal income 
per capita in state j. This variable constitutes a measure of expected income/wage 
prospects in state j. Specifying the income variable in this fashion in effect allows for the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
2000; Milligan, 2000; Davies, Greenwood, & Li, 2001; Cebula & Alexander, 2006. 
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probability of obtaining the observed per capita personal income found in state j (Saltz, 
1998; Cebula & Alexander, 2006). The second term on the right-hand-side of (2) is the 
expected income associated with not finding a job in state j. Because this is obviously 
zero, this term cancels out and (2) reduces to 
 EXPINCj = (1-URj) x PCPERSINCj       (2’) 
Clearly, gross in-migration is expected to be an increasing function of EXPINCj, ceteris 
paribus.  
The second economic variable is COSTj, the overall cost of living in state j for the 
average four-person family in the year 2008, expressed as an index, with  
COSTj = 100.00 being the mean value of this variable; in the absence of money illusion, 
gross in-migration is hypothesized to be a decreasing function of COSTj. The adoption of 
a variable such as COSTj is becoming more common (Renas, 1978, 1980, 1983; Cebula, 
1979; Conway & Houtenville, 1998, 2001, 2003; Gale & Heath 2000; Cebula & 
Alexander, 2006).  
The third purely economic variable is POVj, the percent of the population in state 
j that is at 125% of the poverty level or lower. This variable is an additional reflection, 
i.e., representation, of economic prospects in state j for the would-be migrant. 
Accordingly, the greater the poverty rate in state j, ceteris paribus, the less attractive the 
state will be for would-be migrants, especially for those with lesser skills or educational 
achievement levels (Vedder, 1976; Cebula, 1979).  
To measure fiscal factors, four variables are adopted, although arguably one of 
these, the number of state parks per capital (expressed as a decimal), clearly could be 
alternatively categorized as a quality-of-life variable. In any case, the first fiscal factor 
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variable considered in this study is AVSTINCTRTj, the year 2008 average effective state 
personal income tax rate in state j, expressed as a percentage of the average family 
income in state j in 2008. Such a variable has often been overlooked in studies of a 
Tiebout-type framework, although it has been considered more recently (Conway & 
Houtenville, 2001; Cebula & Alexander, 2006). It is hypothesized here that the gross 
state in-migration rate is a deceasing function of AVSTINCTRTj, ceteris paribus (Tullock, 
1971). Nine states did not have a state income tax, i.e., for them the value of 
AVSTINCTRTj = 0; the states in question are Alaska, Florida, Nevada, New Hampshire, 
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming. 
The variable PCPROPTXj is defined as the year 2008 local (city plus county) 
average per capita property tax liability in state j. Such a variable has often been 
considered in studies of a Tiebout-type framework (Pack, 1973; Barsby & Cox, 1975; 
Greene, 1977; Liu, 1977; Renas, 1980; Conway & Houtenville, 1998, 2001; Gale & 
Heath, 2000; Rhode & Strumpf, 2003; Cebula & Alexander, 2006). It is expected that the 
gross in-migration rate to state j is a decreasing function of PCPROPTXj, ceteris paribus.  
Continuing, the variable PPPUBEDSPj is the nominal outlay in state j per pupil 
on primary and secondary public education in the year 2007 from all sources, federal, 
state, and local; PPPUBEDSPj replaces the very commonly adopted variable per capita 
public education outlays (Pack, 1973; Greene, 1977; Hinze, 1977; Cebula, 1979; Renas, 
1980; Conway & Houtenville, 1998, 2001; Gale & Heath, 2000; Rhode& Strumpf, 2003). 
It is expected that, ceteris paribus, the gross in-migration rate is an increasing function of 
PPPUBEDSPj. 
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Finally, the fourth fiscal variable is STPARKSPCj, the number of state parks per 
capital (expressed as a decimal) in 2007. This form of public expenditure embodies a host 
of potential benefits, fundamentally recreational in nature, such as camping, fishing, 
hiking, boating, picnicking, and the like, and possibly even benefits that are 
environmental in nature, e.g., providing de facto refuge for various forms of wildlife as 
well as protection of nature itself, that would-be in migrants to state j may find of value. 
Accordingly, it is hypothesized that gross in-migration to state j is an increasing function 
of STPARKSPCj. 
Given the dual role played by STPARKSPCj, to measure expressly environmental 
conditions in state j, the focus is on three additional factors. The first of these is 
JANTEMPj, defined here as the mean January temperature in state j (1971-2000), as a 
measure of warmer climatic conditions. As in so many migration studies (Renas, 1978; 
1980; 1983; Clark & Hunter, 1992; Cebula & Belton, 1994; Saltz, 1998; Conway & 
Houtenville, 1998, 2001, 2003; Gale & Heath, 2000; Milligan, 2000; Davies, Greenwood, 
& Li, 2001; Cebula & Alexander, 2006), this variable is treated as a quality-of-life 
control variable. As is typically the case in these studies, it is expected that warm climate 
is likely to increase the inflow of migrants as a reflection of their typical preference for 
warmer climate, ceteris paribus. As an alternative measure of climate, in a separate 
estimate we adopt the variable HDDj, the average annual number of heating degree days 
in state j. In this case, given the hypothesized typical migrant preference for warmer 
climate, in-migration is expected to be a deceasing function of HDDj, ceteris paribus, 
since more heating degree days implies colder climatic conditions. 
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The second expressly quality-of-life variable reflects the relative presence of 
hazardous waste sites in a state in 2008. In particular, the variable HAZARDPCTj 
indicates the percentage of all hazardous waste in the U.S. that is located in state j. Given 
the undesirability of such waste sites, it is expected that gross in-migration is a decreasing 
function of HAZARDPCTj. Finally, the variable AIRPOLDEXj measure the average 
amount of particulate matter in the air in state j in year 2009. Other things held the same, 
it is hypothesized that in-migration will be a decreasing function of the amount of air 
pollution, primarily because of the negative impact of air pollution of health and quality 
of life.   
The reduced-form equations initially to be estimated are given by (3) and (4): 
lnMIGj = a0 + a1 EXPINCj + a2 COSTj + a3 POVj + a4 AVSTINCTRTj 
+ a5  PCPROPTXj  +  a6 PPPUBEDSPj  + a7 STPARKSPCj + a8 JANTEMPj  
+ a9 HAZARDPCTj  + a10 AIRPOLDEXj + u     (3) 
and 
lnMIGj = b0 + b1  EXPINCj  + b2 COSTj + b3 POVj + b4 AVSTINCTRTj 
+ b5 PCPROPTXj  +  b6 PPPUBEDSPj + b7 STPARKSPCj+ b8 HDDj  
+ b9 HAZARDPCTj  +  b10 AIRPOLDEXj + u’     (4) 
where:  
lnMIGj = the natural log of MIGj, as explained above; a0 , b0 = constant terms; and u, u’ 
= stochastic error terms. 
The study includes all 50 states but excludes Washington, D.C. as an outlier; 
indeed, its inclusion altered the results for several variables. Moreover, it can be argued 
as a legitimate omission since it is technically not a state. In fact, inclusion of 
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Washington, D.C. could well raise the question of whether Puerto Rico should have been 
included in the study. Finally, omission of Washington, D.C. is consistent with most 
previous migration studies of the U.S. 
  The data source for the variable MIGj was the U.S. Census Bureau (2012, Tables 
13, 33). The sources for computing variable EXPINCj, were the U.S. Census Bureau 
(2010, Tables 13, 616) and U.S. Census Bureau (2102, Table 680), while the data source 
for variable COSTj was ACCRA (2010). The source for variable JANTEMPj was the U.S. 
Census Bureau (2010, Table 378), whereas the data source for variable HHDj is the U.S. 
Bureau of the Census (2010, Table 384). The data for the policy variables AVSTINCTRTj, 
PCPROPTXj, and PPPUBEDSPj were obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau (2010, 
Table 13) and U.S. Census Bureau (2012, Table 555). Data for the variables 
HAZARDPCTj and AIRPOLDEXj were obtained from the U.S. Bureau of the Census 
(2012, Tables 384, 383), while data for STPARKSPCj were obtained from the U.S. 
Census Bureau (2101, Tables 13, 1216). Tables 1 and 2 respectively provide   descriptive 
statistics and the correlations among the explanatory variables5   
Based on the conventional wisdom, as expressed by Tiebout (1956), Tullock 
(1971), as well as Riew (1973), and more recently by Conway & Houtenville (2001) and 
Cebula & Alexander (2006), among others, the following coefficient signs (each case 
assumes ceteris paribus) are hypothesized: 
a1 > 0, a2 < 0, a3 < 0, a4 < 0, a5 < 0, a6 > 0, a7 > 0, a8 > 0, a9 < 0, a10 <0  (5) 
                                                          
5 Only those coefficients for POVj and JANTEMPj (0.497), POVj and EXPINCj (-0.650), 
and HAZARDj and PCPROPTXj (0.757) were of concern. Thus, there arguably are only 
three cases of problematic multicollinearity; however, the variables involved in all three 
cases all exhibit statistically significant coefficients, so that multicollinearity does not 
appear to be a serious issue. Also, for example, when we estimated the model without 
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b1 > 0, b2 < 0, b3 < 0. b4 < 0, b5 < 0, b6 > 0, b7  > 0, b8 < 0, b9 < 0, b10 < 0      (6)  
                                                                                                                                                                             
POVj the results were qualitatively similar and EXPINCj remained statistically 
significant.  
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Empirical Results 
Initial Estimates 
 
Table 3 columns (a) and (b) presents results of the semi-log estimations of equations (3) 
and (4) using OLS, with the White heteroskedasticity (1980) correction. Consider first the 
results in column (a). Of the ten estimated coefficients, nine exhibit the expected signs, 
with five statistically significant at the 1% level and three statistically significant at the 
5% level. Only the coefficients on variables AIRPOLDEXj and PPPUBEDSPj fails to 
exhibit the hypothesized sign or statistical significance at the 10% level of better.  The 
coefficient of determination (R2) is 0.78, whereas the adjusted coefficient of 
determination (adjR2) is 0.73, so that the model explains approximately three-fourths of 
the variation in the dependent variable, lnMIGj. Finally, the F-statistic is statistically 
significant at the 1% level, attesting to the overall strength of the model.  
 Among the economic variables of interest, expected per capita personal income 
exhibits a coefficient that is positive and statistically significant at the 2.5% level. Hence, 
during the Great Recession, gross state in-migration was positively attracted to states 
with higher levels of expected per capita personal income. Recall that this expected 
income measure was generated by combining considerations of both the prevailing per 
capita personal income in state j and the unemployment rate in state j.  
Next, the cost-of-living variable exhibits a negative coefficient that is statistically at the 
1% level. Not surprisingly, during the Great Recession, a higher cost of living negatively 
impacted the gross state in-migration rate. The poverty variable is negative and 
statistically significant at the 5% level. Thus, a higher value for the POVj variable could 
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be expected to have reduced the state gross in-migration rate to state j during the Great 
Recession. 
 Among the (purely) quality-of-life variables, we first consider the warm weather 
control variable, JANTEMPj. The coefficient on this variable is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level; thus, as anticipated, a higher average January temperature in 
state j, i.e., states with warmer climates elicited higher gross in-migration rates (Renas, 
1983; Clark & Hunter, 1992; Saltz, 1998; Conway & Houtenville, 1998, 2001; Gale & 
Heath, 2000). The coefficient on the hazardous waste variable, HAZARDPCTj, is 
negative and statistically significant at the 2.5% level. In this case, a higher value in state 
j for this variable elicited a lower gross in-migration rate. In contrast to the statistically 
significant effects of JANTEMPj and HAZARDPCTj, the coefficient on the air pollution 
variable, AIRPOLDEXj, was statistically insignificant at even the 10% level and hence 
did not exercise a perceptible impact on the state gross in-migration rate over the study 
period; this result differs from results for the same variable found in Cebula & Alexander 
(2006). 
 Finally, we focus on the public policy variables, including the hybrid variable 
STPARKSPCj, which is partly a quality of life variable. The results in column (a) indicate 
that the coefficient on this variable was positive and statistically significant at the 1% 
level, implying that the greater the number of state parks per capita in state j, the greater 
the gross in-migration rate to state j. Presumably, this attraction of migrants reflects the 
recreational dimension of this form of state government outlays. The average effective 
state income tax rate in state j, AVSTINCTRTj,  has  a negative and significant coefficient  
(at the 1% level),  indicating that   higher average effective income tax rate in state j 
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would result in lower gross in-migration rate to state j.  The per capita property tax 
variable, PCPROPTXj, has a negative sign and is also statistically significant at the 1% 
level. Thus, the higher the per capita property tax in state j, the lower the gross in-
migration rate to the state. Finally, the coefficient on variable PPPUBEDSPj is not 
statistically significant at even the 10% level indicating that public education spending 
per pupil did not influence gross state in-migration during the “Great Recession.” 
 In sum then, for the period 2008-2009 of the Great Recession, the gross state-
level in-migration rate was an increasing function of expected per capita personal 
income, state parks per capita, and warmer January temperatures. For the same study 
period, the gross in-migration rate was a decreasing function of the cost of living, the 
poverty rate, the average state income tax rate, per capita property taxation, and 
hazardous waste sites. Finally, public education spending per pupil and the air pollution 
index both failed to influence the gross state in-migration rate for the study period.   
 
Alternative Estimates and Robustness Checks 
Next, we conduct several robustness checks by using alternate specifications such as the 
linear, and log-log models, and also by using alternate measures for weather and 
hazardous wastes.   In Table 3 column (b), we re-estimate the model with an alternative 
measure of weather, “heating degree days,” which reflects colder weather patterns. 
Presumably, this variable should negatively influence the gross in-migration rate. The 
results in columns (a) and (b) are qualitatively very similar to one another, as one would 
presumably expect.  In column (b), all ten of the estimated coefficients exhibit the 
expected signs, with five statistically significant at the one percent level and three 
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statistically significant at the five percent level. In tandem, the coefficients of 
determination (R2 and adjR2) indicate that the model explains roughly three-fourths of the 
migration rate variation. The F-statistic is significant at the one percent level, indicating 
the overall strength of the model. 
In this estimation, expected per capita personal income exhibits a coefficient that 
is positive and statistically significant at the 2.0% level. Hence, during the Great 
Recession, gross state in-migration was positively attracted to states with higher levels of 
expected per capita personal income. Next, the cost-of-living variable exhibits a negative 
coefficient that is statistically at the 1% level. Thus, during the Great Recession, a higher 
cost of living negatively impacted the gross state in-migration rate. As for the poverty 
variable, it is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. Thus, a higher value 
for the POVj variable could be expected to have reduced the state gross in-migration rate 
to state j during the Great Recession. 
As for the coefficient on HDDj, it is negative (as expected) and statistically 
significant at the 1% level in both estimates, suggesting that environments having colder 
climates are less attractive/appealing to migrants. Clearly, including such a climate 
variable, as an alternative to variable JANTEMPj, is of value and provides insights 
consistent with the variable JANTEMPj (Renas, 1983; Clark & Hunter, 1992; Saltz, 
1998;Conway & Houtenville, 1998, 2001; Gale & Heath, 2000). The coefficient on the 
hazardous waste variable, HAZARDPCTj, is negative and statistically significant at the 
2.5% level. Hence, a higher value in state j for this variable elicited a lower gross in-
migration rate. Once again, in contrast to the statistically significant effects of JANTEMPj 
and HAZARDPCTj, the coefficient on the air pollution variable, AIRPOLDEXj, was 
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statistically insignificant at even the 10% level and hence did not exercise a perceptible 
impact on the state gross in-migration rate over the study period. 
 Finally, the four variables reflecting our interpretation of the Tiebout or Tiebout-
Tullock hypothesis are considered. The results in column (a) indicate that the coefficient 
on variable STPARKSPCj was positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, 
implying that the greater the number of state parks per capita in state j, the greater the 
gross in-migration rate to state j. Regarding the average effective state income tax rate in 
state j, AVSTINCTRTj, its coefficient is negative and also statistically significant at the 
1% level, implying that the higher the average effective income tax rate in state j, the  
lower the gross in-migration rate to state j would be. As for the per capita property tax, 
this variable, PCPROPTXj, has a negative sign and is statistically significant at the 1% 
level as well. Thus, the higher the per capita property tax in state j, the lower the gross in-
migration rate to the state. Finally, the coefficient on variable PPPUBEDSPj is not 
statistically significant at even the 10% level; hence, this public policy variable did not 
influence gross state in-migration during the study period. 
 We also estimate equations (3) and (4) in strictly linear form to examine whether  
the results shown in Table 2 hold up with an alternative specification.  The results of 
these two estimations are provided in columns (c) and (d) of Table 2.  In column (c), all 
ten coefficients exhibit the expected signs, with four statistically significant at the 1% 
level, two statistically significant at the 5% level, and two statistically significant at the 
10% level.  The R2, adjR2, and F-statistic values are similar to (albeit somewhat smaller 
than) those in the semi-log estimates found in columns (a) and (b). In the linear estimate 
in column (d), all ten coefficients exhibit the expected signs, with four statistically 
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significant at the 1% level, three statistically significant at the 5% level, and one 
statistically significant at the 10% level. In addition, the R2, adjR2, and F-statistic values 
are similar to those shown in column (c). Overall, then, the linear estimation results 
provided in columns (c) and (d) of Table 2 provide support for the conclusions obtained 
from the semi-log estimates in columns (a) and (b) of the Table. 
As a modest, simple test of the robustness of the basic model, we now provide in 
Table 4 four parallel estimates, with the modeling difference being the substitution of 
toxic chemical releases per square mile in state j in 2008 (TOXICj)  rather than our 
hazardous waste variable, HAZARDPCTj,. As shown, the overall results are compatible 
with those in Table 2, lending further credibility to our basic conclusions. Namely, it 
appears that for the period 2008-2009 of the Great Recession, the gross state-level in-
migration rate was an increasing function of expected per capita personal income, state 
parks per capita, and warmer January temperatures. For the same study period, the gross 
in-migration rate was a decreasing function of the cost of living, the poverty rate, the 
average state income tax rate, and per capita property taxation. Furthermore, as opposed 
to an aversion to hazardous waste sites per se, there is evidence,  in these new estimates, 
albeit more modest, of an aversion on the part of migrants to states having higher levels 
of toxic chemical releases, which among other things can jeopardize the water supply and 
impose other costs on the population as well. 
 As a final test of the consistency of the model, we provide in Table 5 two 
additional estimates. Both are log-log estimations of the model in equation (3). The 
problem with this endeavor is the fact that nine of the states in the sample have no state 
income tax, i.e., AVSTINCTRTj = 0. To overcome this challenge, we first estimate the 
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model after adding a tax rate to the average effective tax rate equal to 0.1% for all 50 
states; thus, for estimation purposes, in order to include all 50 states, we artificially 
assume a tax rate of 0.1% in states not having an income tax. While this is not pure, the 
difference between a state income tax rate of 0% and 0.1% can probably be viewed as 
trivial in most cases. This log-log estimate is provided in column (a) of Table 3.  
Nevertheless, since only 41 states actually have a non-zero state income tax rate, the 
second estimation of the model looks solely at those 41 states, i.e., drops the nine no-
state-income states from the estimation. This log-log estimate is provided in column (b) 
of Table 5.  
 The results in both columns of Table 5 are compatible with the four estimates in 
Table 2 with a single exception, namely, the state parks per capita variable, 
STPARKSPCj, is not statistically significant at the 10% level in these estimates. 
Otherwise, the results are effectively compatible with their counterparts in Table 2. 
Before closing, we interpret the results in column (a) of Table 5, so as to end this study 
with more precise conclusions. In these interpretations, the effects of the variables 
STPARKSPCj, PPUBPEDSPj, and AIRPOLINDEXj are not quantified because of their 
statistical insignificance in these two estimates.    
Accordingly, we first observe that for the period 2008-2009 of the Great 
Recession, the gross state-level in-migration rate was an increasing function of expected 
per capita personal income and warmer January temperatures. For the same study period, 
the gross in-migration rate was a decreasing function of the cost of living, the poverty 
rate, the average state income tax rate, per capita property taxation, and hazardous waste 
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sites. The impact of state parks per capita, while significant in the semi-log and linear 
estimates, was not statistically significant in the log-log estimates.  
Finally, we observe that, based on column (a) of Table 5, which refers to all 50 
states, the following appears to be the case: a 10% increase in expected per capita 
personal income raises the gross in-migration rate by 2.47%; a 10% higher cost of living 
reduces the gross in-migration rate by 2.11%; a 10% higher poverty rate reduces gross in-
migration by 4.89%; a 10% warmer mean January temperature raise gross in-migration 
by 3.99%, and a 10% higher percentage in hazardous waste sites reduces gross in-
migration by 0.75%.  Furthermore, a 10% higher average effective state personal income 
tax rate reduces the gross in-migration rate by 0.22%; that is, a 10% higher average per 
capita local property tax reduce gross in-migration by 2.21%. The latter two results imply 
that the search for “fiscal surplus” appears to be ongoing.   
  
Conclusions  
 This empirical study has investigated fiscal, as well as economic and non-economic 
(quality-of-life) determinants of gross state in-migration in the U.S. over the 2008-2009 
period, with the specific intent of investigating whether there continues to be empirical 
support for the Tiebout (1956)-Tullock (1971) hypothesis even during the Great 
Recession.  
The findings provided in this study support the hypothesis in terms of the 
contemporary mobility of consumer-voters. Our results suggest that even during the 
“Great Recession”, consumer-voters evaluate both the government provision of goods 
and services and the tax burden in their migration decisions; however, during the “Great 
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Recession” some public goods factored more prominently in their migration decisions 
than others.  Both the linear and semi-log specifications allow for three purely economic 
factors, three (or four) quality of life variables, and four fiscal factors. For the period 
2008-2009 of the “Great Recession,” the gross state-level in-migration rate was an 
increasing function of expected per capita personal income, state parks per capita, and 
warmer January temperatures. For the same study period, the gross in-migration rate was 
a decreasing function of the cost of living, the poverty rate, the average state income tax 
rate, per capita property taxation, and hazardous waste sites. All of the estimates yield 
results suggesting consistently, as in previous studies of earlier time periods, that 
migrants (consumer-voters) at the very minimum prefer lower state income tax burdens 
and lower property tax burdens. Consumer-voters’ evaluation of government services in 
determining their choice of location during the “Great Recession” appears to depend 
upon the type of government service.  While consumer-voters on average appear to prefer 
states with greater public provision of state parks,   our results do not indicate a strong 
preference for states with higher per pupil outlays on primary and secondary public 
education. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable   Mean   Standard Deviation 
lnMIGj   1.0055    0.362 
MIGj    2.91    1.038     
EXPINCj    36,561    5.687 
COSTj    99.3    17.31 
POVj    12.36    3.22 
AVSTINCTRTj  2.897    1.96 
PCPROPTXj     1,145    1,652 
PPPUBEDSPj   7,112     1,591 
STPARKSPCj   0.00015   0.00074 
 
JANTEMPj   32.709    12.646 
 
HDDj    5,001    2,202 
 
HAZARDPCTj  2.002    2.0654 
 
AIRPOLDEXj   55,918    23,738 
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Table 2. Correlation Matrix among Explanatory Variables 
 
            EXPINC  COST POV AVSTINCTRT  PCPROPTX PPPUBEDSP STPARKSPC JANTEMP HAZARDPCT AIRPOLDEX    
 
 
 
EXPINC      1.0 
 
 
COST      0.269    1.0 
 
 
POV      -0.650    -0.412    1.0 
 
 
AVSTINCTRT 0.297   0.038 -0.281    1.0  
 
 
 PCPROPTX     0.345   -0.242   -0.052   0.261          1.0  
 
 
 PPPUBEDSP       0.470 -0.185 -0.016   0.315          0.491               1.0  
 
 
 STPARKSPC     0.116   0.289   -0.134   -0.226          -0.106 -0.117 1.0   
 
 
 JANTEMP        -0.211   0.088   0.497   -0.235           0.150 0.170 -0.101  1.0  
 
 
 HAZARDPCT   0.310   -0.112   -0.149   0.313            0.757 0.420 -0.114  0.052       1.0 
 
 
 AIRPOLDEX   0.109    0.049   -0.120   -0.142           -0.134 -0.144         -0.273        -0.029       -0.020  1.0 
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Table 3. Determinants of Gross In-Migration in US States 
Semi-log and Linear Models 
 
Dependent Variable    lnMIGj  lnMIGj MIGj  MIGj 
Variable\Coefficent  (a)  (b)  (c)  (d) 
 
EXPINCj   0.000002** 0.000002** 0.000006** 0.000007** 
    (2.33)  (2.46)  (2.12)  (2.19) 
 
COSTj    -0.0085*** -0.0001*** -0.0206*** -0.0187*** 
    (-4.77)  (-4.19)  (-3.78)  (-3.27) 
 
POVj    -0.0379** -0.0373** -0.0993* -0.091* 
    (-2.11)  (-2.07)  (-1.93)  (-1.69) 
 
AVSTINCTRTj  -0.0465*** -0.0512*** -0.156** -0.1699*** 
    (-2.83)  (-3.08)  (-2.45)  (-2.62) 
 
PCPROPTXj   -0.00004*** -0.00004*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** 
    (-4.22)  (-4.19)  (-3.56)  (-3.54) 
 
PPPUBEDSPj   -0.0000003 0.0000005 0.00001 0.00001 
    (-0.05)  (0.07)  (0.63)  (0.65) 
 
STPARKSPCj   0.107*** 0.131*** 0.434*** 0.4736*** 
    (4.66)  (4.65)  (5.40)  (4.81) 
 
JANTEMPj   0.0112*** -------  0.0258*** ------- 
    (4.59)    (3.26) 
 
HDDj    -------  -0.00006*** -------  -0.00013** 
      (-3.39)    (-2.20) 
 
HAZARDPCTj  -0.0488** -0.0486** -0.1208* -0.1338** 
    (-2.31)  (-2.35)  (-1.98)  (-2.04) 
 
AIRPOLDEXj   -0.00145 -0.0014 -0.0041 -0.0039 
    (-1.25)  (-1.19)  (-1.17)  (-1.11) 
 
n    50  50  50  50 
R2    0.78  0.77  0.74  0.73 
adjR2    0.73  0.71  0.68  0.66 
F    13.94*** 12.97*** 11.38*** 10.44*** 
 
***statistically significant at 1% level; **statistically significant at 5% level; 
*statistically significant at 10% level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 29 
 
Table 4. Determinants of Gross In-Migration in US States –Semi-log and Linear 
Models with Alternate Variables 
Dependent Variable    lnMIGj  lnMIGj MIGj  MIGj 
Variable\Coefficent  (a)  (b)  (c)  (d) 
 
EXPINCj   0.000002** 0.000002** 0.000006* 0.000007** 
    (2.03)  (2.13)  (1.98)  (2.08) 
 
COSTj    -0.0087*** -0.0085*** -0.0211*** -0.02*** 
    (-5.46)  (-5.53)  (-4.35)  (-4.31) 
 
POVj    -0.0402** -0.044*** -0.1057** -0.109** 
    (-2.54)  (-2.81)  (-2.34)  (-2.36) 
 
AVSTINCTRTj  -0.0457*** -0.0487*** -0.154** -0.163** 
    (-2.85)  (-2.89)  (-2.38)  (-2.49) 
 
PCPROPTXj   -0.00005*** -0.00005*** 0.00014*** -0.000142*** 
    (-6.35)  (-6.78)  (-4.96)  (-5.16) 
 
PPPUBEDSPj   -0.000003 -0.000002 0.000004 0.000006 
    (-0.52)  (-0.39)  (0.22)  (0.35) 
 
STPARKSPCj   0.094*** 0.1246*** 0.398*** 0.458*** 
    (3.55)  (4.27)  (4.38)  (4.39) 
 
JANTEMPj   0.0125*** -------  0.0292*** ------- 
    (5.47)    (4.25) 
 
HDDj    -------  -0.00007*** -------  -0.00017*** 
      (-5.05)    (-3.56) 
 
TOXICj   -0.94*  -1.1848** -2.601  -3.11* 
    (-1.73)  (-2.30)  (-1.54)  (-1.90) 
 
AIRPOLDEXj   -0.0021 -0.0021 -0.006  -0.0058 
    (-1.63)  (-1.67)  (-1.60)  (-1.57) 
 
n    50  50  50  50 
R2    0.79  0.80  0.76  0.75 
adjR2    0.74  0.74  0.69  0.69 
F    14.95*** 15.21*** 12.13*** 11.67*** 
 
***statistically significant at 1% level; **statistically significant at 5% level; 
*statistically significant at 10% level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 5. Determinants of Gross In-Migration in US States – Log-log Model 
 
Dependent Variable     lnMIGj§  lnMIGj §  
Variable\Coefficent  
lnEXPINCj    0.247***  0.138*** 
     (6.36)   (2.84) 
 
lnCOSTj    -0.211***  -0.203*** 
     (-3.26)   (-2.95) 
 
lnPOVj    -0.489***  -0.415**   
     (-3.25)   (-2.45) 
 
lnAVSTINCTRTj   -0.022**  -0.02** 
     (-2.14)   (-2.10) 
 
lnPCPROPTXj   -0.221***  -0.12*** 
     (-5.21)   (-2.76) 
 
lnPPPUBEDSPj   -0.008   -0.098 
     (-0.15)   (-1.63) 
 
lnSTPARKSPCj   0.013   0.017 
     (0.35)   (0.39) 
 
lnJANTEMPj    0.399***  0.387*** 
     (3.58)   (3.06) 
 
lnHAZARDPCTj   -0.075***  -0.086*** 
     (-3.30)   (-3.58) 
 
lnAIRPOLDEXj   -0.017   -0.009 
     (-0.59)   (-0.30) 
 
n     50   41 
R2     0.79   0.75 
adjR2     0.75   0.70 
F     12.14***  13.02*** 
 
***statistically significant at 1% level; **statistically significant at 5% level; 
*statistically significant at 10% level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
§ The first column includes all states; the second column includes only those states that 
collect personal income tax.  
